GIVE EVERY AIRMAN AND EVERY DATA SET A UNIQUE ID — A LUGGAGE TAG FOR DATA
STEP 1 — FRAGMENTED RECORDS (TODAY)

Three systems hold their own copies of the same people — with different spellings, no shared identity, and one record too ambiguous to trust:

HR-SYS
SOURCE RECNAMEDOBINSURANCE
SR-HR-3341JORDAN A. MICHAELS1996-04-12ACTIVE
SR-HR-3342RILEY T. CARTER1994-08-30ACTIVE
SR-HR-3343RILEY T. CARTER1999-01-17PENDING
MED-SYS
SOURCE RECNAMEDOBCLEARANCE
SR-MED-88231JORDAN MICHEALS SPELLING VARIES1996-04-12FIT
SR-MED-4402R. CARTER NO DOB — AMBIGUOUS—?
TRN-SYS
SOURCE RECNAMEDOBTRAINING
SR-TRN-A19FM. MICHAELS SPELLING VARIES1996-04-12CURRENT
Source records stay exactly as they are — the identity layer never overwrites them. Two different people share one name; one record has no date of birth and could belong to either. Nothing talks to anything.
STEP 2 — A HUMAN REVIEWS AND APPROVES EACH IDENTITY MAPPING
STEP 2 — IDENTITY REVIEW GATE

The engine proposes candidate links. A human approves or rejects each one — no silent merging:

CANDIDATE LINKEVIDENCEDECISION
SR-HR-3341 + SR-MED-88231 + SR-TRN-A19F → UID 4X7Q-92 DOB matches on all three; name is a spelling variant of one person PROPOSED
SR-HR-3342 → UID 9ZK1-04  ·  SR-HR-3343 → UID 7TT8-55 Same name, different DOB — two different people, must stay separate PROPOSED
SR-MED-4402 → ? No DOB, initial-only name — could match either CARTER or neither PENDING REVIEW
Provenance stored per mapping: which source records, what evidence, who approved, when. The ambiguous record stays unresolved — by design.
0 of 2 mappings approvedREVIEWER: HUMAN (REQUIRED)
STEP 3 — ONE QUERY, ONLY WHAT YOU'RE CLEARED TO SEE
STEP 3 — AUTHORIZED LOOKUP
SIMULATED ROLE:
QUERY UID:
RESPONSE PAYLOAD — fields returned per illustrative policy (production: enforced server-side)
FIELDVALUESOURCE RECORD
Approve the identity mapping in Step 2, then run a lookup.
AUDIT TRACE
awaiting query…
IDLE UID = IDENTITY · POLICY = AUTHORIZATION · THEY ARE SEPARATE
Knowing a UID identifies an entity — it grants nothing. Fields you are not cleared for are absent from the payload (shown masked for the demo). The ambiguous record cannot be queried as a person until a human resolves it. In production the real matching and policy logic runs server-side and stays closed-source; this browser demo is a simulation with synthetic data.
UID = IDENTITY · POLICY = AUTHORIZATION · THEY ARE SEPARATE THINGS